The Fall of Practical Reason 3

As promised, here's part 3 of my thoughts on the issue of practical reason and how it relates to our fallenness as humans. But first, a recap.

In post 1, I highlighted the apparent tension between the biblical account of man's fallenness pervading his reason, and the phenomena of seemingly very smart people using their practical reason very well. Practical reason, as mentioned previously, is reasoning with respect to what to do; it has to do with the actions we perform. In part 2, I suggested a way to look at this problem by drawing a distinction within the realm of practical reason itself, namely, the distinction between

(a) how we should achieve our goals/desires/aims (instrumental reason), and
(b) the kinds of goals/desires/aims we should have (telic reason).

I suggested that there's basically not that much a problem with people with regards to (a) - that is to say, most people function not to badly with respect to their instrumental reason. Sure, there are those who are subject to conditions such that even with instrumental reason, they fail to act rationally. One might take for example, a person suffering from depression who actually desires to get well, and believes that the best way to do that is to seek medical attention, and somehow just cannot find the motivation to do it. (There is, of course, to a lesser extent, the same phenomenon whenever we just want to laze in bed despite all reason not to.) But these are the exceptions rather than the norm. For most of us, fallen as we are, we nevertheless function ok in being motivated to do the things to achieve our goals.

Now in this 3rd part, I want to say what has gone wrong with our telic reason. I wish to highlight just how fallen this aspect of our reason is, and also why it is a part of our reason as opposed to merely our desires. Consider first a simple case, The Incredible Sulk.

The Case of The Incredible Sulk:
Tommy (5 years old) is unhappy that his mother did not buy him the $3 million Ferrari he saw zooming past on the street. As a result, he wants everyone around him to be unhappy as well. So he tries to sulk for the whole day, knowing that his parents do not like it. He also knows that by doing that, he would have to miss his favorite dinner as punishment. Moreoever, it is pretty tiring to sulk the whole day and pretend no one else exists. Yet, he simply wants to do it to spoil everyone's mood.

Here, it seems that Tommy prefers his own unhappiness as long as others around him can be made unhappy as well. We might say that he was rebellious, recalcitrant, or incorrigible, even. But at the same time, it seems that his desire is irrational, unreasonable. One might want say to Tommy, "Hey, look here boy. It's silly to do that!" And by "silly", we don't just mean something that is morally wrong, but rather that there's something intellectually, rationally deficient about him. And this is the point I wish to highlight here. It's downright foolish of Tommy to have such desires. What good might be gained from making everyone, including himself, unhappy?

But on further reflection, don't we do that all the time? We desire temporal comfort more than eternal security - many would rather laze around on Sunday than go to church when invited. We desire things that we know would lead to short-lived pleasure and long-term consequences. We do and say things that hurt others and don't benefit ourselves. Our desires are directed to the immediately pleasurable rather than the ultimately good, to convenience rather than right principles. Our goals become the mere satisfaction of current desires, without reflection on whether these are worthy, righteous, honourable, commendable desires. Indeed, these words have been rendered almost 'out-of-fashion' by the relativistic, do-whatever-you-want, respect-my-rights (including my right to be downright stupid, we might add) culture of today.

In fact, the whole question of life's purpose, or teleology, is swept aside under the carpet. (Only to re-emerge in the angst of teenage life, the stark reality of mid-life and the quiet desperation of old age.) Ask the question today, "what kinds of goals/desires/aims should I have?", and you are likely to get a strange reply along the lines of, "do whatever you really want. Follow your heart." Which sounds oh-so-nice, until you realise the question hasn't been answered at all. Phrased another way, the original question is simply "What should I want? What should my heart desire?", and the reply becomes just "Want what you want, and desire what you desire." Some help that gives.

The modern world is particularly prone to this paralysis of purpose. And it is not surprising, because we have lost the ability to reason properly with ourselves what is best. We either think that there is no best, that the best is unknowable, or that everyone's best is up to them. We are blind, in fact, to the all-surpassing worth of Christ, to the glory of the eternal God, to the satisfaction of our deepest needs in Him. At least, until He does a special work in us.

And that, I think, is the crux of the fallenness of practical reason. We can diagnose it in many ways, we can identify it's failings as we did above; we can also sum it up in 4 words: we don't desire God. And that is the worst kind of answer one could give to the question in (b): what should I desire?

The one object that is supremely good, righteous, loving, glorious and worthy, we have failed to seek Him and want Him. We have irrationally rebelled against Him, to our own detriment. The telic aspect of our practical reason is found sorely wanting. Of course, this is inseparable from the moral dimension. But it is also a matter of reason. So then, the Biblical writer reminds us,

The fear of the LORD is the beginning of wisdom, and knowledge of the Holy One is understanding." Proverbs 9:10

The Fall of Practical Reason 2

In my last post, I raised a potential problem: The Bible tells us that we are fallen. This surely includes our reason, in particular, our practical reason. But looking at many people around, they seem to be using their practical reason perfectly well. (see examples in last post.) Now i suggest a way to look at this that resolves the problem.

First, we must be more precise. Practical reasons, as I said, are considerations in favor of us performing certain actions. What then, counts as a reason, or gives us a reason to act in a certain way? Standard examples in philosophical literature consist of beliefs and desires combined in a relevant way. Consider:

1. Arthur desires to have a cold Ribena.
2. Arthur believes that to have a cold Ribena, he needs to walk to the fridge.

Most people agree that the truth of 1 and 2 gives Arthur a reason to walk to the fridge. (Of course, Arthur might not necessarily walk to the fridge as a result of 1 and 2, for this reason might be trumped by stronger reasons (e.g. He is actually a surgeon perfoming a delicate operation at the moment, and so on.))

If Arthur is rational, he would acquire a motivation to walk to the fridge (again, this motivation could be overridden by other considerations). He is, in a way, responding to the reason provided by the truth of 1 and 2. (Of course, this example is so simple that most of us don't even consciously reason this way. But it is nevertheless very plausible.)

This sort of practical reasoning is called instrumental reasoning. It helps someone to achieve his/her desires, or more broadly speaking, his/her goals. I want a car. Instrumental reasoning helps me to think of how to get one (rent? buy? earn more money? loan?), depending on the beliefs I have about cars and so on. I want to get A for my module. Instrumental reasoning tells me (via my beliefs) that I should study hard and practice exam papers. And so on.

I want to submit that there is nothing very wrong about our practical reason, insofar as it pertains to instrumental reasoning. (There could be other things wrong, such as lack of willpower to achieve the goals, etc.) But on my view, that is not all there is to practical reason. In particular, a truly rational person should not only know what he should do to achieve his desires/goals, he should also know what kinds of desires and goals he should have.

In other words, a truly rational person should desire the right things, the good things, the best things in life. And by the right things, I obviously don't just mean what an individual thinks is right to do. I mean it in an objective, absolute sense. I mean it in the sense in which rightness is not a function of a person's desires and beliefs, but something that is independant of whether people think it as right or want to do it.

(The philosopher David Hume was famous for denying this. To him, all practical reasoning was instrumental. Thus, according to Hume, " 'Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger. 'Tis not contrary to reason for me to chuse [choose] my total ruin, to prevent the least uneasiness of an Indian or person wholly unknown to me." I don't buy Hume's view, but I will not argue against it here. I simply assume that it's false.)

This last aspect of practical reason can be referred to as telic reason. (Kant calls it the categorical imperative, but we shall not go there in this post.) Now think about it. Is the telic aspect of our practical reasoning gone astray? I would say yes. Try thinking of some examples, before the next post comes out. :)

The Fall of Practical Reason 1

"The fear of the LORD is the beginning of wisdom, and knowledge of the Holy One is understanding." Proverbs 9:10

Practical reason refers, roughly speaking, to whatever counts in favor of us performing certain actions. For example, I might say that you have reason to save a drowning person. You might have reason not to cheat in an exam, or to go get some food at the hawker centre. (There is also theoretical reason, which are also known as reasons for us having certain beliefs. But I will not discuss that here.)

Now the Bible tells us that we are fallen, and in Reformed theology, the understanding is that a proper reading of the text entails that the 'fallenness' affects all aspects of the person - the emotions, the desires and the mind. So then, this implies that there must be something very wrong with our rationality. And if our rationality includes practical rationality, then there is something very wrong with our practical rationality.

Now the problem is, this last part might not seem apparent to many. Consider, for example, the fact that many brilliant scientists, philosophers and politicians are non-Christians. Or the fact that my neighbour can very well perform actions rationally - when he is hungry, he goes to the fridge to get food, and not to the wardrobe. Our non-Christian classmates might know how to score on an exam better than we do. The upcoming entrepreneur whose business is growing fast due to his innovative products might not believe in God at all. All these people seem to be using their reason rather well. In particular, the latter examples seem to be examples of good usage of practical reason. And since Christians are on the road of sanctification and having their fallenness, so to speak, redeemed in a sense, shouldn't Christians be doing much better than non-Christians in terms of acting in accordance to reason? What's the difference?

How then, is our practical reason fallen? I suggest a possible way of looking at this in the next post.