Friday, May 30, 2008

The Fall of Practical Reason 2

In my last post, I raised a potential problem: The Bible tells us that we are fallen. This surely includes our reason, in particular, our practical reason. But looking at many people around, they seem to be using their practical reason perfectly well. (see examples in last post.) Now i suggest a way to look at this that resolves the problem.

First, we must be more precise. Practical reasons, as I said, are considerations in favor of us performing certain actions. What then, counts as a reason, or gives us a reason to act in a certain way? Standard examples in philosophical literature consist of beliefs and desires combined in a relevant way. Consider:

1. Arthur desires to have a cold Ribena.
2. Arthur believes that to have a cold Ribena, he needs to walk to the fridge.

Most people agree that the truth of 1 and 2 gives Arthur a reason to walk to the fridge. (Of course, Arthur might not necessarily walk to the fridge as a result of 1 and 2, for this reason might be trumped by stronger reasons (e.g. He is actually a surgeon perfoming a delicate operation at the moment, and so on.))

If Arthur is rational, he would acquire a motivation to walk to the fridge (again, this motivation could be overridden by other considerations). He is, in a way, responding to the reason provided by the truth of 1 and 2. (Of course, this example is so simple that most of us don't even consciously reason this way. But it is nevertheless very plausible.)

This sort of practical reasoning is called instrumental reasoning. It helps someone to achieve his/her desires, or more broadly speaking, his/her goals. I want a car. Instrumental reasoning helps me to think of how to get one (rent? buy? earn more money? loan?), depending on the beliefs I have about cars and so on. I want to get A for my module. Instrumental reasoning tells me (via my beliefs) that I should study hard and practice exam papers. And so on.

I want to submit that there is nothing very wrong about our practical reason, insofar as it pertains to instrumental reasoning. (There could be other things wrong, such as lack of willpower to achieve the goals, etc.) But on my view, that is not all there is to practical reason. In particular, a truly rational person should not only know what he should do to achieve his desires/goals, he should also know what kinds of desires and goals he should have.

In other words, a truly rational person should desire the right things, the good things, the best things in life. And by the right things, I obviously don't just mean what an individual thinks is right to do. I mean it in an objective, absolute sense. I mean it in the sense in which rightness is not a function of a person's desires and beliefs, but something that is independant of whether people think it as right or want to do it.

(The philosopher David Hume was famous for denying this. To him, all practical reasoning was instrumental. Thus, according to Hume, " 'Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger. 'Tis not contrary to reason for me to chuse [choose] my total ruin, to prevent the least uneasiness of an Indian or person wholly unknown to me." I don't buy Hume's view, but I will not argue against it here. I simply assume that it's false.)

This last aspect of practical reason can be referred to as telic reason. (Kant calls it the categorical imperative, but we shall not go there in this post.) Now think about it. Is the telic aspect of our practical reasoning gone astray? I would say yes. Try thinking of some examples, before the next post comes out. :)

Tuesday, May 27, 2008

The Fall of Practical Reason 1

"The fear of the LORD is the beginning of wisdom, and knowledge of the Holy One is understanding." Proverbs 9:10

Practical reason refers, roughly speaking, to whatever counts in favor of us performing certain actions. For example, I might say that you have reason to save a drowning person. You might have reason not to cheat in an exam, or to go get some food at the hawker centre. (There is also theoretical reason, which are also known as reasons for us having certain beliefs. But I will not discuss that here.)

Now the Bible tells us that we are fallen, and in Reformed theology, the understanding is that a proper reading of the text entails that the 'fallenness' affects all aspects of the person - the emotions, the desires and the mind. So then, this implies that there must be something very wrong with our rationality. And if our rationality includes practical rationality, then there is something very wrong with our practical rationality.

Now the problem is, this last part might not seem apparent to many. Consider, for example, the fact that many brilliant scientists, philosophers and politicians are non-Christians. Or the fact that my neighbour can very well perform actions rationally - when he is hungry, he goes to the fridge to get food, and not to the wardrobe. Our non-Christian classmates might know how to score on an exam better than we do. The upcoming entrepreneur whose business is growing fast due to his innovative products might not believe in God at all. All these people seem to be using their reason rather well. In particular, the latter examples seem to be examples of good usage of practical reason. And since Christians are on the road of sanctification and having their fallenness, so to speak, redeemed in a sense, shouldn't Christians be doing much better than non-Christians in terms of acting in accordance to reason? What's the difference?

How then, is our practical reason fallen? I suggest a possible way of looking at this in the next post.
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