The Fall of Practical Reason 2

In my last post, I raised a potential problem: The Bible tells us that we are fallen. This surely includes our reason, in particular, our practical reason. But looking at many people around, they seem to be using their practical reason perfectly well. (see examples in last post.) Now i suggest a way to look at this that resolves the problem.

First, we must be more precise. Practical reasons, as I said, are considerations in favor of us performing certain actions. What then, counts as a reason, or gives us a reason to act in a certain way? Standard examples in philosophical literature consist of beliefs and desires combined in a relevant way. Consider:

1. Arthur desires to have a cold Ribena.
2. Arthur believes that to have a cold Ribena, he needs to walk to the fridge.

Most people agree that the truth of 1 and 2 gives Arthur a reason to walk to the fridge. (Of course, Arthur might not necessarily walk to the fridge as a result of 1 and 2, for this reason might be trumped by stronger reasons (e.g. He is actually a surgeon perfoming a delicate operation at the moment, and so on.))

If Arthur is rational, he would acquire a motivation to walk to the fridge (again, this motivation could be overridden by other considerations). He is, in a way, responding to the reason provided by the truth of 1 and 2. (Of course, this example is so simple that most of us don't even consciously reason this way. But it is nevertheless very plausible.)

This sort of practical reasoning is called instrumental reasoning. It helps someone to achieve his/her desires, or more broadly speaking, his/her goals. I want a car. Instrumental reasoning helps me to think of how to get one (rent? buy? earn more money? loan?), depending on the beliefs I have about cars and so on. I want to get A for my module. Instrumental reasoning tells me (via my beliefs) that I should study hard and practice exam papers. And so on.

I want to submit that there is nothing very wrong about our practical reason, insofar as it pertains to instrumental reasoning. (There could be other things wrong, such as lack of willpower to achieve the goals, etc.) But on my view, that is not all there is to practical reason. In particular, a truly rational person should not only know what he should do to achieve his desires/goals, he should also know what kinds of desires and goals he should have.

In other words, a truly rational person should desire the right things, the good things, the best things in life. And by the right things, I obviously don't just mean what an individual thinks is right to do. I mean it in an objective, absolute sense. I mean it in the sense in which rightness is not a function of a person's desires and beliefs, but something that is independant of whether people think it as right or want to do it.

(The philosopher David Hume was famous for denying this. To him, all practical reasoning was instrumental. Thus, according to Hume, " 'Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger. 'Tis not contrary to reason for me to chuse [choose] my total ruin, to prevent the least uneasiness of an Indian or person wholly unknown to me." I don't buy Hume's view, but I will not argue against it here. I simply assume that it's false.)

This last aspect of practical reason can be referred to as telic reason. (Kant calls it the categorical imperative, but we shall not go there in this post.) Now think about it. Is the telic aspect of our practical reasoning gone astray? I would say yes. Try thinking of some examples, before the next post comes out. :)